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SAVE THE CHILDREN: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY
APPLIES THE GRAVE RISK DEFENSE IN ACOSTA V. ACOSTA
Liz LaFoe∗
ABSTRACT
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction was enacted for the protection of children as well as the deterrence
of international forum shopping in custody disputes. If returning children to
their home nation would pose a grave risk to their safety, it is acceptable for
them to remain with the abducting parent until courts make an official custody
determination. Showing a grave risk of harm is an allowable affirmative
defense under the statute. In Acosta v. Acosta, the Eighth Circuit allowed the
petitioner’s children to remain in the United States, finding that returning them
to their home nation of Peru would subject them to a grave risk of harm. A
circuit split currently exists on the affirmative defense of grave risk of harm.
Some courts end their analysis once a grave risk of harm is proven. Others,
such as the Eighth Circuit in Acosta, take the further step of assessing whether
the home nation would take measures to protect the children if they were
returned.
INTRODUCTION
Child abduction is against the law.1 In cases of domestic violence, however,
sometimes the woman’s only feasible escape necessitates taking her child out
of the country.2 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction was enacted for the protection of children as well as the
∗ Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review; Rule 13 Certified Law Student, University of Missouri
Family Violence Clinic; J.D. Expected May 2015, University of Missouri School of Law; Registered Nurse,
University of Missouri Health System; B.S.N. University of Florida 2009; I would like to thank Professor
Mary Beck for all of her guidance; her dedication to mentoring law students and advocating for families is
truly inspiring; I would also like to thank my friends and family for their enduring love and support.
1 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (1980); Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter “Hague Convention”]; International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e) (1994) [hereinafter “ICARA”]. See generally, Sharon Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children:
Implications of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 669 (2001).
2 Nelson, supra note 1, at 669–70.
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deterrence of international forum shopping in custody disputes.3 Even in cases
of domestic violence, the Hague Convention outlaws the removal of the child
from his abusive parent by the victim parent.4 Exceptions, in the form of the
affirmative defenses, are built into the Act.5 If returning children to their home
nation would pose a grave risk to their safety, it is acceptable for them to
remain with the abducting parent until courts can make an official custody
determination.6 Interpreting this international law and its Grave Risk exception
present unique challenges to U.S. Courts. The Eighth Circuit’s recent decision,
Acosta v. Acosta, demonstrates a correct interpretation of the statute and
application of the grave risk defense.7
I. FACTS
In 2002, Ricardo Acosta, a Peruvian citizen, married Anne, a U.S. citizen in
Minnesota.8 During their marriage, Ricardo verbally abused Anne, had
frequent outbursts in front of the children, and became violent.9 One of their
children, M.A.A., showed severe behavioral problems while attending a
Peruvian school.10 Ricardo and Anne saw a counselor, but by 2010 their
relationship deteriorated to the point where they were sleeping in separate
rooms and Anne was “afraid of Ricardo.”11
Anne and Ricardo agreed in November 2010 that she would take the
children to Minnesota to visit relatives over the holidays, December through

3 See generally, Tracy Bateman Farrell, Construction and Application of Grave Risk of Harm Exception
in Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as Implemented in International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A), 56 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 163 (2013); Julieta Chiquillo,
Mother’s Arrest at D/FW Airport Shows Difficulties of International Custody Disputes, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2014), www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20140914-mother-s-arrest-at-dfw-airportshows-difficulties-of-international-custody-disputes.ece; Keith Perry, Former Met Detective Jailed in
Singapore for Trying to Snatch Custody Battle Child, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/uknews/crime/11087889/Former-Met-detective-jailed-in-Singapore-for-trying-to-snatch-custodybattle-child.html.
4 See generally, Farrell, supra note 3.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Acosta v. Acosta, 725 F.3d. 868 (8th Cir. 2013).
8 Id. at 871.
9 Id. at 872 (explaining that Ricardo pushed child M.A.A. onto a bed, became enraged at a taxi driver
and “shattered the taxi’s windshield”).
10 Id. (stating that M.A.A. told teachers “he wanted to kill himself” and the principal of the school
testified that “M.A.A.’s behavior problems were the third most severe she had seen in her nineteen years of
teaching”).
11 Id.
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February.12 Ricardo did not join them, despite encouragement from Anne’s
parents.13 During the visit, Anne and her parents did not allow Ricardo to
speak to the children over the phone.14 Meanwhile, “M.A.A. had violent
outbursts, wet his bed at night, and said he wished he were dead.”15
In early February, before the scheduled return to Peru, Anne told Ricardo
she wanted a divorce and was keeping the children in America.16 Then Anne,
her brother Jeffrey, and two of Anne’s co-workers, LeBoo and Johansen, went
to Peru to collect her and the children’s belongings.17 Once they arrived at
Ricardo’s apartment, Anne called Ricardo to let him know she was “packing
her things.”18 Ricardo responded in an outrage “telling Anne and Jeffrey that
he loved his family and that he was going to kill himself.”19 Then, he “arrived
at the apartment building in a rage, crashing his car into a pole and smashing a
window of the taxi waiting for Anne and the others.”20 Despite attempts to
keep him out, Ricardo kicked open the apartment door, breaking it apart and
forcing entry.21
Once inside, “Ricardo began throwing items at Anne[,] . . . grabbed a knife
from the kitchen and chased the men while Anne and LeBoo retreated to a
back room. . . [then Ricardo] chased Johansen outside, where he cut
Johansen’s leg with a knife”22 while Anne’s brother “begged for his life.”23
Finally, Ricardo “forced his way into the back room” and battered both LeBoo
and Anne.24 He did this despite the arrival of the police, “who stood passively
by until finally taking action to restrain [him].”25
Even after Anne returned to the United States, Ricardo called her and her
family multiple times with death threats directed at her, the children, and
himself.26 Anne then met with Minnesota police where they issued an arrest
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 872–73.
Id. at 873.
Id.
Id.
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warrant for Ricardo.27 In March 2011, directly following Ricardo’s custody
action for the children in Peru, “Anne filed for dissolution of marriage in
Minnesota, in which she sought custody of the children.”28 However, her
petition was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.29
In May 2011, during his visit to Miami, Florida, Ricardo was arrested and
extradited to Minnesota.30 Thereafter, he pled guilty to violating a Minnesota
statute criminalizing “terroristic threats,” and served his probation sentence in
Peru.31 While on probation, he was “allowed to visit with his children via video
conference, which he did on only one occasion.”32 Ricardo then sought the
return of his children under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (Hague Convention) and 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et
seq., the corresponding U.S. law.33
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota found that, although
Anne had wrongfully detained the children, returning them would expose them
to a grave risk of harm.34 Ricardo’s petition was denied and he appealed on the
basis that the court erred in (1) finding a grave risk of harm; (2) admitting
expert testimony; and (3) dismissing his claim against Anne’s parents.35 Anne
cross-appealed that the district court erroneously denied one of her affirmative
defenses.36
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court and dismissed Anne’s crossappeal.37 The court held: (1) it was within the district court’s discretion to
admit the expert testimony; (2) clear and convincing evidence supported the
finding that returning the children to Peru would place them in grave risk of
harm; and (3) it was within the district court’s discretion to refuse to return the
children, even if safety measures were taken.38

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 869.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Hague Convention
The chief aim of the Hague Convention was to keep parents from abducting
children to engage in international forum shopping.39 Parents can seek the
return of their children to the children’s home nation so that its courts can
resolve custody disputes and decide visitation rights and related civil law
matters.40 In his article, International Family Law, Robert G. Spector artfully
summarizes the requirements for obtaining a return order:
To obtain a return order the petitioner must prove that: (1) the child
was abducted from, or retained from returning to, the country of the
child’s habitual residence; (2) the petitioner had a “right of custody”
under the law of the abducted-from State that is recognized under the
Convention; and (3) the petitioner was actually exercising those
rights, or would have exercised those rights but for the abduction.41

These petitions can be heard in federal or state court.42 If the court finds for the
petitioner, the children are returned to the petitioner’s country for further
proceedings (i.e., the court hearing the petition cannot itself resolve any further
disputes, including those concerning dissolution of marriage, child custody,
and visitation rights).43
The Convention allows five exceptions to the mandated return of children
to their country of habitual residence.44 Any of these exceptions allow the child
to remain in the country, typically with the abducting parent. The exceptions
are raised as affirmative defenses and are “strictly construed so as to honor the
objectives of the Convention.”45 The defenses are: (1) the abductor had the
consent of the petitioner to take the children; (2) the petitioner was not
exercising his or her custody rights when the children were “wrongfully”
taken; (3) a statute of limitations bars petitions after one year; (4) returning the
children would be a human rights violation in that it would force the child to

39
40

See Farrell, supra note 3.
Robert G. Spector, International Family Law, 47 A.B.A. INT’L L. YEAR

2013).
41
42
43
44
45

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Nelson, supra note 1, at 672.
Id. at 675.
Id. (citing ICARA, 42 U.S.C. §11601(a)(4), (b) (1994).

IN

REV. 147, 148 (Spring
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endure conditions that “shock the conscience;” and (5) returning the child
would place the child in grave risk of harm.46
The first three defenses are proved using a preponderance of the evidence
standard.47 The last two require “clear and convincing evidence.”48 The
defense that returning the children would be a human rights’ violation was
“controversial” during the Convention and has never been used.49 The grave
risk defense is the most commonly used defense50 and was successfully raised
in Acosta v. Acosta.
The Hague Convention does not attempt to address the adequacy of the
laws concerning children in any country; the drafters were aware that due to
familial privacy and parental control of children, even with perfect laws, abuse
can and does go undetected.51 If a grave risk defense is not successfully
asserted, the child must return to his or her country of habitual residence.52
The United States signed and ratified the Hague Convention on Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction.53 The U.S. Congress drafted and
adopted the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–
11, as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 11603(e)(2)(A), which codified the burden of proof
requirements for parents seeking to prove the different exceptions to keep their
children in the abducted to nation.54
B. Prior Case Law
Although the Hague Convention’s requirements for obtaining a return order
are straightforward,55 prior court decisions show conflicts about the application
of the Grave Risk Defense, particularly regarding issues of spousal abuse
without physical abuse to the children,56 psychological harm to the children,57
46

Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 675.
48 Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See Khan v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781, 793 (7th Cir. 2012).
52 See Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 2010).
53 Farrell, supra note 3, §2.
54 Id.
55 See supra Part III.A.
56 Compare Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 376–77 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding husband’s
physical, sexual, and verbal abuse of mother insufficient to show grave risk of harm to child), and Croll v.
Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 554, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding grave risk assertion unsuccessful because child was
not injured, despite multiple assaults to mother), with In re Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 206, 222 (1st Cir. 2001)
47
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and whether the country of the child’s habitual residence would take
satisfactory measures to ameliorate the risk.58
The Grave Risk Defense has evolved in that the interpretation of
psychological harm under the Hague Convention may now include the
potential for post-traumatic stress disorder and separation anxiety.59
Psychological harm is also asserted in cases where children have witnessed the
physical abuse of their mother, but not experienced physical abuse
themselves.60 This was not in issue in Acosta, however, since the district court
found that returning the children would subject them to a grave risk of harm, as
it was likely Ricardo would verbally abuse, threaten, and possibly violently
harm them as well as continue his abuse toward Anne and others.61
A split exists among the federal courts concerning whether to assess if the
country of habitual residence would take satisfactory ameliorative measures to

(overturning district court’s decision that husband’s severe beatings of his wife when she was seven months
pregnant—in front of children—was insufficient for grave risk of harm to children and holding grave risk
defense was successfully asserted). “[C]hildren are at increased risk of physical and psychological injury
themselves when they are in contact with a spousal abuser.” Id. at 220.
57 See Blondin v. Dubois, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283, 294–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding potential for posttraumatic stress disorder and long-term psychological harm sufficient for finding of grave risk); see also
Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that potential psychological harm to child as a
result of separation from the child’s mother may be sufficient for finding of grave risk).
58 Compare Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (D. Md. 1999) (holding that the grave risk
defense was successfully asserted, and children were not eligible to return to foster care in country of habitual
residence), and Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F. Supp. 922, 930 (D. Ariz. 1997) (if grave risk is asserted, child
may stay with abductor in lieu of foster care in country of habitual residence), with Blondin v. Dubois, 189
F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (remanding to district court for a determination of protective measures available
in country of child’s habitual residence and whether those measures were sufficient to warrant returning the
child), and Blondin v. Dubois, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no protective measures in
country of habitual residence sufficient to warrant the return of the child and returning the child would result in
psychological harm due to separation from the mother), and In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 385 (3d
Cir. 2006), and Belay v. Getachev, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 555 (D. Md. 2003), and Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro,
131 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
59 See Blondin, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 294–95 (finding potential for post-traumatic stress disorder and longterm psychological harm sufficient for finding of grave risk); see also Rydder, 49 F.3d at 373 (finding potential
psychological harm to child as a result of separation from the child’s mother may be sufficient for finding of
grave risk).
60 See Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 376–77 (finding husband’s physical, sexual, and verbal abuse of
mother insufficient to show grave risk of harm to child); Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (finding grave risk
assertion unsuccessful because child was not injured, despite multiple assaults to mother); but see In re Walsh,
221 F.3d at 206, 222 (overturning district court’s decision that husband’s severe beatings of his pregnant wife,
in front of children, was insufficient for grave risk of harm to children and holding grave risk defense was
successfully asserted).
61 Acosta v. Acosta, 725 F.3d 868, 876–77 (8th Cir. 2013).
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protect the children if returned.62 Some courts, such as the Eighth Circuit in
Acosta, do consider whether the country of habitual residence is willing and
able to ensure the children’s safety.63 Others simply determine whether the
parent has proved the grave risk defense. If so, they find for the parent, without
taking the further step of analyzing ameliorative measures.64
Whether courts should analyze a country’s ability to take preventative
measures to ensure a child’s safety upon their return is currently the most
notable point of contention regarding the grave risk defense.65 This additional
step is not in the text of the Hague Convention or corresponding statutes.66 In
Acosta, the Eighth Circuit did consider whether Peru, the country of the
children’s habitual residence, could take measures to ameliorate the risk of
harm to the children if they were returned.67 A detailed discussion of the
court’s analysis follows.
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District of Minnesota court’s finding that
Anne could keep her children in the United States because she successfully
raised the affirmative defense that returning the children would pose a grave
62 Compare Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (finding that once the grave risk defense was successfully
asserted, children were not eligible to return to foster care in country of habitual residence), and Steffen F., 966
F. Supp. 2d at 930 (finding that if grave risk is asserted, child may stay with abductor in lieu of foster care in
country of habitual residence), with Blondin, 189 F.3d at 249 (remanding to district court for a determination
of protective measures available in country of child’s habitual residence and whether those measures were
sufficient to warrant returning the child), and Blondin, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89 (finding no protective
measures in country of habitual residence sufficient to warrant the return of the child, and returning the child
would result in psychological harm due to separation from the mother), and In re Application of Adan, 437
F.3d at 385, and Belay, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 555, and Raijmakers-Eghaghe, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
63 See Acosta, 725 F.3d at 877; Blondin, 189 F.3d at 249 (remanding to district court for a determination
of protective measures available in country of child’s habitual residence and whether those measures were
sufficient to warrant returning the child); In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 390; Belay, 272 F. Supp. 2d at
558; Raijmakers-Eghaghe, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 957; Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).
64 See Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 462; Steffen F., 966 F. Supp. at 93; Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d
289, 303 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that father sexually abusing youngest daughter was sufficient to prove grave
risk, and further analysis of whether Sweden could take protective measures was unnecessary); Van De Sande
v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570–72 (7th Cir. 2005) (analyzing whether a country can protect the children
if returned, and ignoring the statutory text of the of the Hague Convention, which only requires a showing of
grave risk); Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that once grave risk is shown, the
Hague Convention does not require an assessment of whether the country of habitual residence could take
ameliorative measures).
65 Nelson, supra note 1, at 690–91.
66 See supra Part II.A
67 See Acosta, 725 F.3d at 877.
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risk of harm.68 Ricardo, the father, raised the following issues on appeal: the
court erred in finding (1) “a grave risk of harm”; (2) “admitting certain expert
testimony”; and (3) “dismissing his claim against Anne’s parents.”69 Anne
cross-appealed with another exception to the Hague Convention.70
The court focused on points one and two, did not address point three, and
“dismiss[ed] Anne’s cross-appeal as moot.”71 The standard of review was de
novo for the assessment of the grave risk defense because it is a “mixed
question of law and fact,”72 and the district court’s admission of the expert
testimony was reviewed for abuse of discretion.73 The court briefly reviewed
and affirmed the district court’s admission of the expert testimony first.74 The
remainder of the opinion discusses and analyzes the grave risk defense and the
possibility of sufficient ameliorative measures.75
Anne’s expert testified as to “several factors [which] indicated that
returning the children to Peru would subject them to a high risk of harm.”76
The district court admitted his testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
702.77 Ricardo’s argument on appeal was a “challenge to the factual basis of
[the expert’s] testimony” in that Ricardo felt the testimony was
“uncorroborated” and told “only Anne’s side of the story.”78
Based on the expert’s interviews with Anne and M.A.A., as well as the
expert’s review of the evidence (which included medical records, school
records, threatening voicemails from Ricardo, and court files), the Eight
Circuit agreed with the district court that the expert’s opinion was based in

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 874 (citing Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 896 8th Cir. 2003)).
Id. (citing David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008, 1014 (8th Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 874–75.
See id. at 875–77.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 874. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify in the form of an opinion of otherwise if: (a) the expert’s . . . knowledge will help the
trier of fact . . . (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702.
78 Acosta, 725 F.3d at 874–75.
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fact.79 Further, the expert “clearly stated the factual basis for his opinions and
was subjected to cross-examination on the issue.”80
Next, the court assessed the Hague Convention and the grave risk defense
(i.e., the Article 13b Exception).81 The court highlighted that the purpose of the
Hague Convention is to assure custody disputes are settled in the “appropriate
jurisdiction” and prevent parents from international forum shopping.82 The
grave risk defense, the court said, is a “narrow exception,” which is proved
through “clear and convincing evidence,” and exists in cases of “serious abuse
and neglect.”83
Ricardo argued that the facts of the case did not support the district court’s
finding of a grave risk of harm.84 Furthermore, he argued that the court abused
its discretion in failing to order the Peruvian court to take measures to ensure
the children’s safety, thus warranting their return.85 The Eighth Circuit
disagreed, highlighting the district court’s finding of facts concerning
Ricardo’s “violence, threats . . . [and] verbal abuse towards the children, Anne,
[and] others.”86 Although Ricardo did not physically abuse the children, the
court noted an absence of physical abuse does not negate the possibility of a
grave risk of harm under the Hague Convention.87
Ricardo further asserted “finding a grave risk of harm based on [these facts]
will allow courts to refuse to return a child whenever there is any indication of
domestic violence, no matter how slight.”88 The court denied this assertion
based on the evidence, including the expert testimony and factual findings of
the district court, which “show that Ricardo does not have the emotional
fortitude to acknowledge custody of his children may ultimately be with
Anne.”89 The court made clear its concern about the safety and lives of the

79

Id. at 874.
Id.
81 Id. at 875.
82 Id.
83 Id. (internal citations omitted).
84 Id. at 876.
85 Id. at 877.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 876 (citing Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008)). The Acosta court quoted the Baran
court, stating, “despite the absence of evidence showing that the father abused the child in the past, [his]
alcohol abuse, violent temper, abuse of the mother in the child’s presence, and threats to hurt the child justified
a finding of a grave risk of harm.” Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
80
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children if they were returned to Peru, particularly if a Peruvian court took the
children from Ricardo and gave custody to Anne, which seemed highly
likely.90
The Eighth Circuit went on to cite two cases from the First and Seventh
Circuits where the children were returned to their countries of habitual
residence because the domestic violence in the home was not found to rise to a
level sufficient for the grave risk defense.91 This was in response to Ricardo’s
claim that finding a grave risk of harm in his case would ensure courts always
found a grave risk of harm in even “slight” domestic violence cases.
Finally, the opinion addressed Ricardo’s argument that the district court
should have returned his children to him because Peru could have taken
measures to “ameliorate” the risk of harm.92 Although the court cited the
Hague Convention and noted that courts do not have to return children once
the abducting parent has proven a grave risk of harm—and many are reluctant
to do so—they still indulged Ricardo’s argument. The court noted that Ricardo
bears the burden of proof for showing Peru would take measures to ameliorate
the risk to the children if they were returned (i.e., the Peruvian government and
law enforcement would successfully protect the children).93
Ricardo did not suggest any measures to the district court. On appeal, his
suggestions were limited to services the Peruvian government already had in
place (e.g., “protection orders, battered women shelters, and a domestic abuse
hotline”).94 So Ricardo did not succeed in proving Peru would protect the
children if they were returned.95 The Eighth Circuit also pointed out the fact
that the Peruvian police had failed to promptly and immediately restrain
Ricardo when he was attacking Anne and her friends. This weighed strongly
against Ricardo’s assertion that Peru would ameliorate the risk of grave
harm.96

90

Id.
Id. (citing Altamiranda Vale v. Avila, 538 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting grave risk defense
where father struck his son with a video-game cord once) and Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460 (1st Cir.
2000) (rejecting grave risk where father verbally abused and shoved mother a single time)).
92 Id. at 877.
93 Id. (citing Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2007) and Van De Sande v. Van De Sande,
431 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2005)).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
91
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Therefore, the Eight Circuit held it was within the district court’s discretion
to admit the expert testimony and that clear and convincing evidence supported
the finding that returning the children to Peru would place them in grave risk
of harm.97
IV. COMMENT
Acosta v. Acosta was well reasoned and the Eighth Circuit reached the
correct result. Given the severity of the abuse in this case, the threats, verbal
assaults, and violent acts towards Anne, the children, and family and friends,
returning the children to Peru would have subjected them to a grave risk of
harm. Even in the United States, Anne and her children were—and perhaps
continue to be—at risk in that Ricardo made frequent threatening phone calls
to Anne and her family and even came to Miami in an attempt to abduct his
children.
Although, the Eighth Circuit correctly decided the case, the court’s
discussion evinced little. First, when the court responded to Ricardo’s
argument that finding a grave risk of harm in his case would lead courts to
refuse to return children in any case of “slight” domestic violence, he cited two
domestic violence cases from the First and Seventh Circuit where the courts
declined to find a grave risk of harm. Second, the court allowed Ricardo to
argue for the return of his children based on steps Peru could take to ameliorate
the risk.
The first criticism is a small one. Because of Ricardo’s obvious lack of
knowledge concerning domestic violence, and his own propensity towards it,
the court’s time was not well spent providing him with examples of “slight”
domestic violence cases where a grave risk was not found.98 A better opinion
would have attempted to educate Ricardo and other readers about the policy
behind the grave risk defense, which exists to protect children from domestic
violence, a worldwide problem.
Pointing out the existence of cases involving “slight” domestic violence,
particularly when those cases were not binding on the Eighth Circuit,99
97

Id.
The two cases the court cited were: Altamiranda Vale v. Avila, 538 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting grave risk defense where father struck his son with a video-game cord once) and Whallon v. Lynn,
230 F.3d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting grave risk where father verbally abused and shoved mother a
single time). Id.
99 Id.
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suggests an acceptable level of domestic violence exists. Even a hint of
tolerance for domestic violence does not serve abusers, or society, well. On the
other hand, the court well spent a considerable portion of the opinion
highlighting the severity of the abuse in this case and the grave risk of danger
Ricardo poses to his children.
The second criticism is more substantive. Once grave risk is proven, the
text of the Hague Convention and 42 U.S.C. § 11601 does not require courts to
analyze whether the country of habitual residence would take measures to
ameliorate the risk of harm to the children. A circuit split currently exists.
Some courts stop their analysis once the parent has proven the grave risk
defense. Others, such as the Eighth Circuit in Acosta, take the further step of
assessing whether the petitioning parent’s country would take ameliorative
measures sufficient to protect the children from the grave risk of harm.100
Common sense suggests courts should act in the best interests of the child.
So if the court has found returning the child to the petitioning parent’s country
would jeopardize his or her safety, the inquiry should end there. Considering
whether the country would take ameliorative measures is without merit.
In this case, the court gave cursory consideration to Ricardo’s argument
that Peru would keep the children safe. The court pointed out his failure to
suggest any ameliorative measures to the district court, and noted the only
protections he suggested on appeal were measures already in place in Peru for
all domestic violence victims: restraining orders, abuse hotlines, etc.101 The
court also noted the lack of timely response on the part of the Peruvian police
when Ricardo was attacking Anne and her friends.102 The court should not
have discussed the possibility of amelioration and considered Ricardo’s
suggestions because the law allows the analysis to end once the grave risk
defense is proven.
Ricardo’s arguments failed and the court reached the right result. Too
much time and attention was devoted to his assertion that his abuse was not
serious enough to merit a successful assertion of the grave risk to the children,
particularly given the harm children incur just watching their father
intentionally abuse their mother. And the court should have ended its analysis

100
101
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See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.
See id.
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after affirming the district court’s finding of the grave risk defense instead of
going on to assess the possibility of ameliorative measures.
CONCLUSION
In Acosta, the Eighth Circuit rendered a thoughtful opinion prioritizing the
safety of the children involved because the court allowed them to remain in the
United States, finding that returning them to Peru would subject them to a
grave risk of harm. The opinion is problematic in that the court entertained,
albeit briefly, Ricardo’s argument that his violence did not rise to the level of
posing a grave risk of harm to his family. The court also did not stop its
analysis once Anne proved returning the children would place them in grave
risk of harm. As the court pointed out, the text of the Hague Convention did
not require them to address Ricardo’s argument that Peru would take measures
to keep the children safe.
Because a circuit split currently exists on the interpretation of the grave risk
defense and whether an assessment of ameliorative measures is required, the
subject is ripe for Supreme Court review. Ideally, the Supreme Court will one
day resolve the split in favor of the parent who has proven returning the
children would place them in grave risk of danger, empowering the circuit and
district courts to end their analysis once grave risk is proven instead of going
on to consider ameliorative measures.

